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Two taxation schemes were designed to be included in a multi-regional multi-sectoral
General Equilibrium model for reducing the use of commercial fertilizers, with the goal of
alleviating surface water pollution. Under the 500% tax rate, results showed that 0.1% of the
national income was given up in order to exchange for a 3% reduction in the fertilizer application
used as an intermediate input. Furthermore environmental quality would be improved by 3%, if a
linear relationship existed between the changes in intermediate fertilizer use and the improvement
in environmental quality. 1
“Green Taxes”: Impacts on National Income, Social Welfare, and Environmental Quality
INTRODUCTION
 Many studies provided evidence that agricultural production, especially crop production,
was a major contributor for nutrients runoff. The 1994 National Water Quality Inventory Report
to Congress published by the USEPA indicated that “Agriculture is the leading source of
impairment in the Nation’s rivers and lakes, affecting 60% of the impaired river miles and 50% of
impaired lake acres ...”. The present federal administrative approach has been to attempt to
reduce the overall quantity of chemical fertilizer applied in agriculture. Although the correlation
between quantity applied and quantity entering surface water is not direct,  federal agencies and
environmental groups are assuming that reduction in quantity applied will lead to some
improvement in water quality.
Restricting agricultural chemicals is one of  several options policy makers consider to
prevent further damage to water quality. Several studies have attempted to capture the effect of
the complete bans on certain chemicals on particular crops (Osteen and Kuchler, 1986 and 1987).
At least thirty-seven States have their own laws regulating environmental quality (Rendleman,
1991). State policies include taxing fertilizer (Ribaudo and Woo, 1991), regulating tillage
practices, and restricting quantities of chemical use (Ribaudo and Woo, 1991). Most of the
previous studies focused on one-at-a-time, chemical-by-chemical, and site-specific regulating
policies. The economic consequences of a general reduction in fertilizer use  have not been
throughly studied. The impacts of the federal level fertilizer taxes on the entire economy are
unknown. Since fertilizer is the most important intermediate input to agricultural production, thelinkages and after-tax changes between fertilizer and other production factors (labor, capital, and
land) still puzzle economists.
The purpose of this article is to determine the effects of the general fertilizer taxes on the
fertilizer sector, national income, social welfare, and environmental quality. A Computable
General Equilibrium (CGE) Model is applied to this study. The model structure, including
benchmark data and how two tax schemes are incorporated into the CGE framework,  is briefly
described in the second section. By introducing two tax schemes (a uniform tax and a regionally
differentiated tax), we would like to explore the changes in the quantity of the fertilizer produced
and used as intermediate input in the third section. The fourth section discusses the impacts of the
fertilizer tax on national income as well as social welfare. The fifth section discusses the linkages
between the changes in the intermediate fertilizer use, the changes in the national income, and the
changes in the environmental quality. Finally the last section provides conclusions and suggestions
for future research.
MODEL STRUCTURE
 In contrast to most previous studies which adapted partial equilibrium analysis (Huang
and Lantin, 1993; Liapis, 1994; Taylor, et al. 1991; Barse, et al. 1988), a multi-sector, multi-
regional Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) model is developed for this study in order to
assess the tax impacts on the general economy. Agriculture is a relatively small sector compared
to the overall economy in terms of factor/output relationship. However government programs
targeted at agriculture constitute a large portion of government spending, and the potentially
significant macro effects associated with agricultural chemical restrictions are still not clear. ACGE model is more appropriate for analyzing linkages between industries, factor markets,
government accounts, macro balances, and allows prices and quantities adjust to clear markets for
products and factors. In this analysis, a fertilizer tax is introduced in the economy to increase the
“user cost” for all  fertilizer consumers (including producers and household). A CGE model is
able to capture the changes in prices and quantities in each sector for domestic supply, domestic
consumption, domestic intermediate use, export, import, and in factor markets.
Nineteen sectors were defined in the economy producing nineteen goods (for final
consumption or intermediate use), including Livestock, Great Plains Food Grains, Midwest Food
Grains, Southeast Food Grains, Rest of the US Food Grains, Great Plains Feed Grains, Midwest
Feed Grains, Southeast Feed Grains, Rest of the US Feed Grains, Great Plains Oilseeds, Midwest
Oilseeds, Southeast Oilseeds, Rest of the US Oilseeds, Other Agricultural Products, Agricultural
Processing, Nitrogen and Phosphorus, Other Agricultural Inputs, Mining and Manufacture, and
Services. Notice that Food Grains, Feed Grains, and Oilseeds are further disaggregated into four
regions according to the different levels of the fertilizer application.
There is only one representative household and an explicit Government in the simulated
economy. The household provides production factors to agricultural sectors and non-agriculture
sectors. The household also purchases composite goods from domestic production and imports.
Producers pay wages to the household, and produce nineteen goods for either domestic
consumption (including final consumption and intermediate use) or exports. Both the household
and producers pay taxes to the Government. They also receive transfers from the Government.
Rest of the World industry directly links to domestic economy by import-export transactions. On
the import side, our model incorporates the “small country” assumption: world prices areexogenous. On the export side, we assume downward-slopping demand curves for some of the
U.S. exports (including Livestock, all Food Grains, and all Feed Grains). 
Technology for domestic production is represented by a Cobb-Douglas value-added
production function with primary factors. Primary factors include agricultural labor, agricultural
capital, agricultural land, non-agricultural labor, and non-agricultural capital. We assume no
mobility among agricultural factors and non-agricultural factors. The usage of intermediate inputs
in each sector are fixed by the constant Input-Output coefficients. There is no substitution
between primary factors and intermediated inputs. There is also no substitution among
intermediate inputs. A Constant Elasticity of Transformation (CET) function is used to describe
how sectoral production is transformed into goods for domestic markets and export markets.
The household can choose between present consumption and savings (either purchasing
domestic or foreign capital goods). The marginal propensity to consume is assumed to be
constant. Consumer expenditures on different goods are a function of prices and income
according to a simplified version of the Linear Expenditure System (LES). The minimum amount
of food or non-food items for household consumption is set to be zero. Household expenditure
shares among different goods are assumed to be fixed, so only income will affect the final
consumption expenditure on each good. However, consumer demands for imports and domestic
goods are distinct with separate sectoral prices by the assumptions about imperfect substitution
and transformation between domestic market and world market. Further  details about modeling
structures and definitions of equations can be found in Liang (1996). Benchmark Data
Benchmark data for the base year (1990) are from two sources: 1990 National Income
and Product Accounts (NIPA), and 1990 Impact Analysis for Planning (IMPLAN) data. The
intermediate demand between sectors are calculated by the IMPLAN program as constant
input/output coefficients. Household consumption, Government consumption shares, employee
compensation, capital income, indirect business taxes, labor income, returns to land, export
volume by sector, and import volume by sector are all from 1990 IMPLAN data. The rest of the
benchmark data are from 1990 NIPA, such as tariff, export subsidies, social security tax, business
profit tax, business savings, capital depreciation, household income tax, household savings,
government transfers to businesses and the household, government savings (usually negative), net
foreign remittances, net foreign transfers, and net foreign savings. Other parameters which can not
be found in 1990 NIPA or 1990 IMPLAN are estimated from parameters in the 1982 ERS/CGE
model. All of the share parameters are in percentages, and the other values are in millions of
dollars for 1990. All of the prices in the base year (1990) are set to one. 
Uniform Tax Versus Differentiated Tax
Two tax schemes are designed in this research in order to provide an economic incentive
for  firms to reduce the consumption of Nitrogen and Phosphorus fertilizer: a uniform tax and a
regionally differentiated tax.
The uniform tax is a single tax rate imposed on the domestic user price of fertilizer
regardless of region, sector, and purpose of purchasing fertilizer. Whoever uses fertilizer must pay
the tax, including intermediate input users, household, government, and capital investment. Tax
rates vary from zero to 500%. The user price of fertilizer after including the uniform tax can be
defined as: User Price of Fertilizer = Producer Price × ( 1 + Tax Rate)Compared to uniform taxes, differentiated tax rates can be charged to fertilizer users
depending on fertilizer pollution levels and cropland areas. Previous studies (Ribaudo, 1989) have
indicated that cropland is a much greater contributor for suspended sediment, Nitrogen, and
Phosphorus in some regions than in others. We calculate a “differentiated tax parameter” based
upon total Nitrogen and phosphorus runoff weighted by cropland shares in four regions (Great
Plains, Midwest, Southeast, and Rest of the U.S.) (Table 1). Non-crop producers (household,
government, and capital investment) still need to pay a general level tax. However crop producers
in each of the four regions are paying different prices (higher than non-crop producers) since the
tax rates are not the same across regions. For example, if the tax rate for non-crop producers is T,
then the tax rate for crop producers in Great plains is T(1+0.0563397), tax rate for crop
producers in Midwest is T(1+0.110915), tax rate for crop producers in Southeast is
T(1+0.006526), and tax rate for crop producers is the Rest of the U.S. is T(1+0.072487). T
varies from zero to 500%, and we totally created 5 levels of differentiated taxes in the economy.
Table 1. Differentiated Tax Parameters for Four Regions
Region TN+TP
1 Shares Cropland Shares
2 Differentiated Tax Parameter
3
Great Plains 0.176276 0.319935 0.056397
Midwest 0.326194 0.340029 0.110915
Southeast 0.035643 0.183099 0.006526
Rest of the U.S. 0.461887 0.156937 0.072487
Note 1: TN = Total Annual Discharge of Nitrogen; TP = Total Annual Discharge of Phosphorus
             Source: Ribaudo, 1989
Note 2: Source: Agricultural Statistics, 1990
Note 3: Parameter = TN+TP Share × Cropland ShareDIRECT AND INDIRECT IMPACTS ON THE FERTILIZER INDUSTRY
The fertilizer industry directly and indirectly links to other sectors in the economy.
Fertilizer becomes more expensive after taxes. Any distortion in the fertilizer user price will affect
everyone who uses fertilizer, especially Food Grains and Feed Grains (Food Grains and Feed
Grains utilize 36% to 44% of the total produced fertilizer in the economy). Let’s consider two
extreme cases where the uniform tax rate is 500% versus no tax. Domestic fertilizer users’ price
increases by more than 500% (548.54%),  and the producer price increases by 8.09%. This result
contradicts what we expect from a partial equilibrium analysis.  When the uniform tax rate is
500% or differentiated tax is at the 5
th level, our study shows that Food Grains and Feed Grain
prices increase by between 13% and 14% for domestic buyers in four regions. This  reflects the
increasing costs to producers in Food Grains and Feed Grains sectors. Domestic outputs of Food
Grains and Feed Grains drop by between 10% and 24%. Domestic sales for Food Grains and Feed
Grains (including domestic and foreign) drop by between 5% and 14%, while exports for these
two sectors fall by  25% to 30%. 
However, Food Grains and Feed Grains producers receive an 17% to 19% increase in
prices, returns to agricultural factors drop substantially as we are going to discuss in the next
section. This means that the windfall profits from producing Food Grains and Feed Grains must
be distributed to intermediate inputs. Since fertilizer has the largest share among all of the
intermediate inputs to Food Grains and Feed grains, it receives a higher profit and fertilizer
producers gets a slightly higher price than the market clearing level. 
When the uniform tax rate is at 500% or the differentiated tax is at the 5
th level, domestic
output of fertilizer falls by 6.5%-6.6%. Domestic sales of fertilizer drops by about 5%, andintermediate use drops by about 3.3%. A greater proportion of fertilizer is used as intermediate
input when the tax is added to its price. When there is no tax, 82% of the fertilizer produced is
used as intermediate input. When the uniform tax is at 500% or the differentiated tax is at the 5
th
level, 85% of the produced fertilizer is used as intermediate input. This result relates to a major
assumption made in the model: there is no substitution between intermediate inputs. 
WHAT HAPPENS TO THE NATIONAL INCOME AND SOCIAL WELFARE?
National income is defined as the sum of the returns to labor, capital, and land, and plus
the transfers from government and foreign sectors. Results from this study show that returns to
agricultural labor, agricultural capital, and land decline significantly given an increasing tax rate,
while there is no significant changes in non-agricultural factors. When the tax is set to be at the
highest level, rents to agricultural factors drop by between 34% and 47%. The most dramatic
reduction in rents happens to agricultural land, which decreases by almost 50%.
Table 2 shows the changes in national income due to two tax schemes. National income
reduces from 4429 (billions of 1990 dollars, no tax) to 4424 (billions of 1990 dollars, a 500%
uniform tax), or to 4423 (billions of 1990 dollars, level 5 differential tax). The percentage change
in national income is very small.  Theoretically any tax is expected to reduce national income as
well as social welfare. The CGE model used in this study assumed a linear relationship between
national income and social welfare. The reduction in national income due to fertilizer tax directly
implies  the reduction in social welfare. This study shows that agricultural factors become much
more worse off comparing to the non-agricultural factors. However national income only reduces
by 0.133% given the highest fertilizer taxes. Fertilizer tax does not have a significant impact onthe national income because: (1) agricultural sectors have relatively small contribution to the
overall economy; and (2) wage rates to agricultural factors are relatively lower than the non-
agricultural factors. 
Table 2. Changes in National Income Due to Two Tax Schemes (billions of 1990 dollars)
Uniform Tax Differentiated Tax
100% 4428.34 (- 0.02%)
* Level 1 4428.32 (- 0.02%)
200% 4427.22 (- 0.05%) Level 2 4427.18 (- 0.05%)
300% 4426.05 (- 0.08%) Level 3 4425.98 (- 0.08%)
400% 4424.82 (- 0.10%) Level 4 4424.72 (- 0.10%)
500% 4423.53 (- 0.13%) Level 5 4423.40 (- 0.14%)
* Note: numbers in the parentheses represent the reduction percentage. The base year national       
       income without a tax is 4429.41 (billions of 1990 dollars).
TRADE OFF BETWEEN NATIONAL INCOME AND ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY
Assuming that there is a relationship between the changes in fertilizer used as an
intermediate input and that changes in environmental quality, the environmental quality should be
improved when the quantity of intermediate fertilizer use is reduced. Table 3 shows the reduction in
national income and fertilizer used as an intermediate input compared to base year (1990). When
the tax rates are in the highest levels, national income reduces by about 6 (billions of 1990 dollars)
and the volume of fertilizer used as an intermediate input reduces by about 0.21 (billions of 1990
dollars). This implies that we need to give up 0.133% of the national income in exchange for a
3.22% reduction in fertilizer application used as an intermediate input. If we assume that there is alinear relationship between the reduction of the intermediate fertilizer use and the improvement of
the environmental quality (i.e. one unit of the reduction in intermediate fertilizer use euqals one unit
of the improvement in environmental quality), then the nation has to give up 0.133% of the income
in exchange for a 3.22% improvement in environmental quality. In both of the tax systems, there
exists a very high correlation between “the reduction in the national income” and “the reduction of
the intermediate fertilizer use”. 
Although the trade off between “national income foregone” and “reduction in the
intermediate fertilizer use” is significant, the percentage of the reduction in intermediate fertilizer
use is not significant given a very high tax rate. Since the  quantity of intermediate fertilizer use is
not reduced significantly given a very high tax rate, fertilizer tax seems to have a small effect on
improving environmental quality. Assuming that there is a linear relationship between “reduction in
fertilizer use” and “improvement in environmental quality”, a 500% tax yields a 3.3% reduction in
fertilizer use, which in turn, implies  a 3.3% improvement in environmental quality for the whole
society. This effect is much smaller than the experience in European countries (Dubgaard, 1990). At
least in a very short term, to impose a fertilizer tax really might not help to reduce nutrient runoff
very much. Table 3. The Reduction in National Income and Fertilizer Used As An Intermediate Input                 
              Compared to Base Year (1990)
_________________________________________________________________________
National Income  Fertilizer Usage








level 1 1.0922 0.0404
level 2 2.2322 0.0818
level 3 3.4292 0.1248
level 4 4.6892 0.1497
level 5 6.0152 0.2167
_________________________________________________________________________
CONCLUSION AND IMPLICATION ON FUTURE POLICIES
While limiting pollution output would seem the direct avenue to environmental protection, the
present political climate seems to prefer limiting inputs such as commercial fertilizers. Unfortunately,
the methods for pinpointing the spatial location of these “nonpoint sources” of pollutants is beyond the
scope of the current paper. However, if one assumes that input reductions is actually pollution
prevention, this study provides an indication of the economic impacts of the resulting environmental
improvement.
Our study provides an example of  input restrictions at the federal level. Even though our model
is only an abstract for the real world economy, the effects of “green tax” on the overall economy are
not significant. The Fertilizer industry only reduces the output level by 7% to 8% when the fertilizer
tax is set at the highest level. Intermediate use of fertilizer only drops by 3% at the similar situation.When a “green tax” is targeted at the heavier fertilizer users such as crop producers, such effects will
be passed on to all of the industries and factors associated with crop production. The net effects to the
whole society’s welfare becomes weaker than  expected. 
The advantage of the tax policy is to internalize “environmental costs” or “user costs” directly.
By adding the tax to user prices, no users will escape from the tax. Tax revenue can be directly
collected by government agencies, then transferred to the public. There are also disadvantages
associated with a tax. Any tax policy targeted at a specific group, such as farmers, has to be very careful
about the distribution of the tax revenue. The welfare of farmers or fertilizer users will be reduced
through the tax. How to distribute the tax revenue among fertilizer users and non-fertilizer users
becomes a very important issue. On the other hand, political costs and operational costs are also major
concerns before formulating the policy schemes. To impose the tax on one industry or one individual
may be scary to the target. But if the taxed target can link to other operations and pass the effects to
others, the net effects will not be significant to the individual any more. Such welfare and political issues
need more studies in the future.
There are other instruments which can reduce the fertilizer use, and may improve environmental
quality indirectly. Limiting fertilizer application on per acreage bases, restricting total fertilizer
production, designing a transferable permit for fertilizer users, and introducing organic farming
practices are just a few examples. To evaluate the effects of these policies on the economy is not easy.
They deserve more detailed study in the future.REFERENCES
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